We Are Training the Internet

My darkest professional suspicion is that Flash is not merely flawed. It is pedagogically harmful. Potentially even by design.

We are teaching users that random plugins are normal. We are teaching them to click Allow on prompts they do not understand. We are teaching companies that rich interfaces can be outsourced to proprietary runtimes. We are teaching management that security warnings are background noise.

We are normalizing software as interruption. Need camera access. Click Allow. Need microphone access. Click Allow. Need storage. Click Allow. Need update. Click Later. Need trust. Click whatever removes the box.

Then years later everyone will wonder why phishing works, why permissions are ignored, why patch fatigue exists, why users cannot distinguish legitimate prompts from malicious ones.

Because we trained them. I feel very much ingrained in the machine that perpetuates this but I am trying. Every bad pattern becomes cultural debt conditioning users who can't be aware and really shouldn't need to be aware of what they are clicking.

But many of us are trying to leave things better than we received. We write cleaner code than the platform deserves. We reduce risk where we can. We document edge cases for future archaeologists. We fix memory leaks in applications that should never have been conceived.

There is a dignity in maintenance, even of doomed things but we must be honest. We are building cathedrals atop a sinkhole and congratulating ourselves on the stained glass. We internet denizens and professionals will spend years recovering from choices currently described as innovative.

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